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Diagnosis of patients with disorders of consciousness (comprising coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and
minimally conscious state) has long been dependent on unstandardized behavioral tests. The arrival of standardized behavioral
tools, and especially the Coma Recovery Scale revised, uncovered a high rate of misdiagnosis. Ancillary techniques, such as
brain imaging and electrophysiological examinations, are ever more often being deployed to aid in the search for remaining
consciousness. They are used to look for brain activity patterns similar to those found in healthy controls. The development
of portable and cheaper devices will make these techniques more widely available.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in medicine have led to an increase in
survival rate after severe brain damage [1]. Many of the
survivors pass into states of disorders of consciousness
(DOC), such as coma, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
(UWS, previously known as vegetative state (VS); [2]), or the
minimally conscious state (MCS) (Figure 1). In this paper,
we will discuss the diﬀerential diagnosis of these patients
using clinical and ancillary methods. Coma is defined as
absence of both arousal and responsiveness and usually lasts
no longer than four weeks. Patients in a coma can recover or
transit to the VS/UWS or MCS or can become locked-in: a
state of near-complete body paralysis in which consciousness
is fully recovered but possibilities for communication are
generally restricted to eye movement and blinking [3]. In
contrast, VS/UWS patients show no behavioral sign of aware-
ness, but have retained some level of arousal. They show eye-
opening, have sleep-wake cycles, and are able to maintain
vital functions unassisted [4]. VS/UWS patients may show
reflex responses to tactile, pain, auditive, or visual stimuli,
but fail to show response to commands. The recent renaming
of the “vegetative state” into UWS has multiple reasons.
Firstly, UWS gives a better description of the behavior
profile in which the patient is awake, but nonresponsive.
Secondly, it has less negative connotation, as a vegetative
state could be associated with the patient being “vegetable-
like” [2]. The VS/UWS can be a permanent state or can
evolve to theMCS. TheMCS is characterized by inconsistent,
nonreflexive behavior indicating a form of fluctuating low-
level awareness [5]. Brain imaging techniques and behavioral
assessments indicate that these patients do feel pain and
emotions, as will be discussed later in this review. The MCS
has recently been stratified into MCS+ (plus) and MCS−
(minus), based on the complexity of behavioral responses.
MCS− refers to patients only showing minimal levels of
behavioral interaction and nonreflexive movements. They
may show orientation to noxious stimuli or visual pursuit
of moving or salient stimuli. Environmental stimuli may
elicit appropriate aﬀectional responses, such as crying or
smiling triggered by familiar voices or faces [6]. MCS+ is
characterized by more complex behaviors such as command
following, language apprehension, intelligible verbalization,
or verbal or gestural yes/no responses [7].

























Figure 1: (a) Chronological order of diagnostic methodology. (b) Flow chart of disorders of consciousness.
Making the distinction between MCS and VS/UWS
patients is a perplexing clinical problem. The clinical pre-
sentations of the patients can be relatively similar, although
they may have significantly diﬀerent levels of awareness. The
diﬀerential diagnosis between the two states is important for
prognostic, therapeutic, and ethical reasons. The prognosis
of MCS is thought to be relatively better than that of
VS/UWS [8, 9]. Giacino and Kalamar [10] showed that
12 months after brain injury, about half of patients in the
MCS showed “no or moderate” disability scores as assessed
by the Disability Rating Scale, compared with only 3%
of the patients in the VS/UWS. Following posttraumatic
MCS patients for five years after injury, Lammi et al. [11]
reported similar recovery rates within the first year. They
also noted that one-third of the patients recovered to a level
of independent functioning within two and five years after
injury.
Besides prognosis, a key question is the potential for
suﬀering in the two states. Patients in the MCS may show
oriented behavioral pain responses, while those in the
VS/UWS do not. Whether the pain reaction in the MCS is
purely reflexive or has a subjective component is not clear,
but evidence from neuroimaging studies suggests the latter
[12]. It is reasonable to assume that interventions such as
social and physical care and adapted analgesia treatment may
help to improve the quality of life and alleviate suﬀering of
these patients. However, such care is resource consuming,
emotionally taxing on the relatives, and may be considered
futile. It might therefore be neglected in cases of VS/UWS
where the prospects of awakening are poor.
Decisions of life and death are diﬃcult but unavoidable
in DOC. The ethical framework of these decisions is incom-
pletely developed, and most life-or-death decisions are taken
on a case-by-case basis and show major culture-dependent
diﬀerences [13]. Recent studies have indicated that our
conception of possible suﬀering in these patients may play
a decisive role in this regard. A European survey showed
that most of the healthcare providers who think a patient
in the VS/UWS does not feel pain, agree with treatment
withdrawal for these patients [14]. Legal precedence from a
series of much debated cases (mainly in the US, and UK) has
established the possibility to withdraw artificial life support
in the chronic phase of VS/UWS [15]. In contrast, a recent
verdict by a British court established the right of a persistent
minimally conscious patient to retain life [16]. In short, the
diﬀerential diagnosis between the MCS and VS/UWS may
have dramatic therapeutic, legal, and social consequences for
the patient. This diagnosis is usually passed using bedside
clinical methods.
2. Clinical Assessment
Consciousness is clinically described as consisting of two
major dimensions: arousal and awareness. Arousal is the
level of alertness, while awareness is the “content” of con-
sciousness. Awareness can in turn be divided into awareness
of the external world and awareness of the internal world
(i.e., stimulus-independent thoughts, mental imagery, inner
speech, etc. [18]). Arousal can be assessed behaviorally by
examining the presence of spontaneous or stimulus-induced
eye-opening. Quantification of awareness through behav-
ioral assessment relies on discriminating between automatic
responses and nonreflex oriented movements or response
to command. Motor responses can be inconsistent, very
small, and easily exhausted [19], making such examinations
challenging. It is important to use examinations that do
not exhaust the patient to a level where he or she loses the
ability to cooperate. For example, visual pursuit is one of the
behaviors distinguishing MCS from VS. Visual stimuli with
emotional importance to the patients—as for example using
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a mirror—provide better results. An explanation for this is
that the autoreferential value of our own image captures our
attention and gives rise to a sense of self-awareness [20].
It has to be kept in mind that although visual pursuit is
associated with consciousness, a lack of visual pursuit does
not indicate unconsciousness.
Several studies have shown an alarmingly high diagnosis
error rate of 30–40% using nonstandardized consensus-
based techniques in DOC [21]. Hence, for reliable bedside
diagnosing, use of systematized scoring systems is mandatory
[6, 21]. Most standardized behavioral scales are relatively
easy to use and do not rely on expensive or specialized
equipment, making it possible for caretakers to apply them
in both hospitals and nursing homes. Recently, the American
Congress of RehabilitationMedicine conducted an evidence-
based review of behavioral assessment scales for DOC, pro-
viding recommendations for clinical use founded on content
validity (i.e., to what degree scale items cover a representative
sample of DOC-relevant behavior), reliability, diagnostic
validity, and ability to predict functional outcomes [22]. The
authors concluded that the Coma Recovery Scale revised
(CRS-r) [6] is the most reliable tool for diﬀerential diagnosis
of DOC.
The CRS-r was developed to diﬀerentiate VS/UWS from
MCS and to identify patients that have emerged from MCS
in the subacute and chronic state. It consists of six subscales
measuring auditory, visual, motor, and verbal functions,
communication and arousal. The first five subscales go from
willful, consistent functional responses to no measurable
response or reflexive activity. The arousal subscale indicates
the level of arousal ranging from attention through eye-
opening to none. The total CRS-r scores range from 0 (worst)
to 23 (best) and are based on specific behavioral responses
to sensory stimuli [6] (see Table 1 for a detailed description
of the scale). The CRS-r has excellent content validity and
is the only scale which includes all of the Aspen Workgroup
criteria for good standardized administration and scoring
[5]. It showed good interrater reliability, test-retest reliability,
and internal consistency.
An alternative to the CRS-r is the Full Outline of
Unresponsiveness score (FOUR). According to the Amer-
ican Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine study, this scale
has good interrater reliability [23]. It uses four subscales:
eye response, motor response, respiration, and brainstem
reflexes, with each subscale having a maximum score of four.
The FOUR was developed for the acute setting, has excellent
internal consistency, and showed to be predictive of good
recovery versus disability or death at one-month after injury
if administered within the first 24 hours after brain injury.
Unfortunately, this scale has ill-defined standardization of
administration and scoring and does not cover all of the
Aspen Workgroup criteria for MCS (low content validity).
Use of the FOUR scale for diﬀerential diagnosis of VS/UWS-
MCS is therefore not recommended [22, 24, 25].
The problem of pain assessment is of equally great
importance, both in the (sub)acute and chronic phases.
Patients in MCS show cerebral correlates of pain processing
similar to healthy awake people and these activations are
more widespread than in VS/UWS [12]. This indicates the
potential for suﬀering of patients in MCS. Patients with
a DOC usually cannot willfully communicate experiencing
pain, but the patients may show clinical signs of suﬀering.
Although a spontaneous facial expression (e.g., a grimace
or a cry) by itself does not imply much, its occurrence
after a noxious stimulation does suggest that the patient
can feel pain. While it cannot be proven that behavior
or brain activations actually correspond to a subjective
experience of pain, the possibility that the patient may be
suﬀering should in itself be reason enough for considerations
of palliative treatment. The Nociception Coma Scale was
developed to assess the behavioral signs of pain in patients to
address the possible need for analgesic treatment. The scale
has demonstrated a good interrater agreement, concurrent
validity and sensitivity [21, 26, 27]. A new version is under
development: the Nociception Coma Scale revised [28]. It
evaluates motor, verbal, and facial responses after noxious
stimulation and can better discriminate between pain and
no pain. The scale ranges from zero to nine (see Table 2),
in which a score of four or higher indicates that the
patient is likely to feel pain, making analgesic treatment
necessary. The Nociception Coma Scale is currently the
most informative tool available. However, the potential for
false negative responses (e.g., in paralyzed patients) and
our limited knowledge of pain perception in this group of
patients indicate a venue of further research, combining
behavioral and neuroimaging tools.
Clinical assessment is a first and important step towards
a proper diagnosis. Unfortunately, behavioral assessment
contains several pitfalls, making it problematic as a stand-
alone tool. Discriminating between reflexive and willful
behavior can be notoriously diﬃcult: for instance, deter-
mining whether an eye-blink or small limb movement
represents an “automatic” reflex or a “willed” consciously
controlled movement may be subjective and challenging. To
avoid misinterpretation, three out of four repetitions of each
task are generally required for a positive result using the
CRS-r, but the risk of false positives cannot be ruled out.
Moreover, several sources of false negative results exist. These
include problems with brain arousal and attention (i.e., the
fluctuating level of consciousness inMCS patients, brainstem
lesions, seizures, sedative or anti-epilepsy or antispasticity
drugs), sensory and motor output (i.e., aphasia, apraxia
or deafness [29, 30]), language comprehension, restraining
and immobilizing techniques, and pain [26]. Therefore,
absence of adequate response to command using traditional
bedside methods does not necessarily prove a patient is
unconscious. Finally, due to lack of a diagnostic gold
standard, criterion validity and diagnostic value (i.e., the
scale’s ability to establish an accurate diagnosis compared
with the true diagnosis as measured by a reference standard)
cannot be determined for any available scoring system
[22].
Recent improvements in imaging-based diagnostic me-
thods may complement the clinical scoring systems, mini-
mizing the risk of taking therapeutic decisions on erroneous
diagnostic backgrounds. As we will see, neuro-imaging
methods can complement clinical assessment by looking
at task-dependent and task-independent brain activations.
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Table 1: Coma Recovery Scale revised.
Description Scored when
Auditory function
(4) Consistent movement to
command#
Object-related eye or limb movement or
movement with nonobject-related commands.
On all 4 trials on 2 diﬀerent commands.
(3) Reproducible movement to
command#
Object-related eye or limbs movement or
movement with nonobject related commands.
3/4 trials on any one of the object or nonobject
related commands.
(2) Localization to sound
Auditory stimulation (e.g., voice or noise) from
the right and the left side for 5 s. Repeat the
procedure 2 times on each side.
3/4 trials on any one of the object or nonobject
related commands.
(1) Auditory startle
Auditory stimulation directly above the
patient’s head and out of view (4 trials).
Eyelid flutter or blink following the stimulus on at
least 2 trials.
(0) None Observed response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Visual function scale
(5) Object recognition∗ Object-related eye or limb movement commands. 3/4 clearly discernible responses.
(4) Object localization:
reaching∗
The patient is asked to touch an object with
his/her arm or leg, 4 trials (2 left, 2 right
presentations).
Movement must occur in the correct direction on
3/4 trials.
(3) Pursuit eye movements∗
Move mirror to the right, left, upper, and lower
directions. 2 trials in every direction (manually
open eyes if necessary).
Eyes must follow the mirror for 45 degrees
without loss of fixation on 2 occasions in any
direction.
(2) Fixation∧
Present a brightly colored object in front of the
patient’s face and then rapidly move to upper,
lower, right, and left visual fields for a total of 4
trials (manually open eyes if necessary).
Eyes change from initial fixation point and then
fixate on the new target location for more than
2 s. At least 2 fixations.
(1) Visual startle
Quickly move a finger to 1 inch in front of the
patient’s eye, while avoiding contact with the
eyelashes or inadvertent production of a breeze
(manually open eyes if necessary). 4 trials per eye.
Blink promptly following presentation of visual
threat on at least 2 trials with either eye.
(0) None Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Motor function scale
(6) Functional object use+
Place one object (comb) in the patient’s hand and
instruct the patient to “show me how to use it.”
Repeat the same instruction with a second object.
2 trials for each object.
Movements executed are compatible with specific
function for both objects on all 4 trials.
Observe for spontaneous automatic motor
behaviors (nose scratching, grasping bedrail)
during the examination.
At least 2 episodes of automatic motor
behaviour are observed within the
examination.
(5) Automatic motor response∗
or
present a familiar gesture (e.g., wave) and ask the
patient to “show me how to wave” 2 times and
“I’m going to wave again. Do not move at all. Just
hold still” 2 times (alternate each command)
Patient performs the gesture on trials
“just hold still.”
or
place a spoon in front of the patient’s mouth
without making contact and ask the patient to
“show me how to use the spoon” 2 times and “I’m
going to show you a spoon. Do not move at all.
Just hold still” 2 times.
Patient performs the gesture on trials
“just hold still.”
(4) Object manipulation∗
Place a ball on the dorsal surface of the patient’s
hands and roll the ball across the index finger and
thumb without touching the surface of the hand
or fingers. Instruct the patient to “Take the ball.” 4
trials.
3/4 trials, the wrist must rotate and the
fingers should extend as the object is moved along
the dorsal surface of the hand; the object must be
grasped and held for a minimum of 5 s.
(3) Localization to noxious
stimulation∗
Apply deep pressure to nail beds of extremities for
a minimum of 5 s. 2 trials on each side for a total
of 4 trials.
The nonstimulated limb must locate and make
contact with the stimulated body part at the point
of stimulation on at least 2/4 trials.




Apply deep pressure to nail beds of each
extremity. 1 trial per extremity.
Isolated flexion withdrawal of at least 1 limb.
(1) Abnormal posturing Observe response to above method.
Slow, stereotyped flexion or extension of the
extremities immediately after the stimulation.
(0) None/flaccid Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Oromotor/verbal function scale
(3) Intelligible verbalization#
Ask the patient to answer autobiographical or
object naming questions.
Each verbalization must consist of at least 1
consonant-vowel-consonant triad, and 2 diﬀerent
words must be documented, and words produced
by writing or alphabet board are acceptable.
(2) Vocalization/oral movement
Nonreflexive oral movements, spontaneous
vocalizations or vocalizations that occur during
administration of vocalization commands.
At least 1 episode of spontaneous nonreflexive
oral movement and/or vocalization (yawning is
scored as reflexive oral movement).
(1) Oral reflexive movement
Present tongue blade between patient’s lips and/or
teeth.
Clamping of jaws, tongue pumping, or chewing
movement.
(0) None Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Communication scale
(2) Functional: accurate+
Ask 6 visual or auditory related questions (“Am I
touching my ear?”, “Am I clapping my hand?”).
Clearly discernible and accurate yes/no responses
on all 6 of the visual or auditory related questions.
(1) Nonfunctional: intentional# Observe response to above method
Clearly discernible and accurate yes/no responses
on at least 2/6 of the visual or auditory related
questions.
(0) None Observe response to above method




Consistency of behavioral responses
following verbal or gestural prompts.
No more than 3 occasions across the length of the
evaluation in which the patient fails to respond to
a verbal prompt.
(2) Eye-opening w/o stimulation
Observe status of the eyelids across length of
assessment.
Eyes remain open across the length of the
examination without the need for any
stimulation.
(1) Eye-opening with stimulation See above.
Tactile, pressure, or noxious stimulation
must be applied at least once during the
examination in order for the patient to sustain eye
opening.




+denotes emergence from MCS.
∧denotes an MCS except for anoxic etiology.
These can be compared to those observed in conscious
healthy controls.
3. Ancillary Testing
3.1. Positron Emission Tomography. Fluorodeoxyglucose
positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) provides a proxy
measure of cerebral glucose consumption, thereby giving
an approximation to functional tissue integrity. This can
accompany structural estimates of brain damage provided
by other brain scan methods [31]. In acute coma, global
brain metabolism is reduced to about 50–70% of normal
[32]. The average global cerebral metabolic rate of glucose
in VS/UWS is about 40–50% of normal values, but may
decrease to 30–40% over time [33].
Several studies have demonstrated that patients in dif-
ferent states of consciousness have distinct regional patterns
of cerebral metabolic dysfunction. These pattern diﬀerences
can potentially serve as landmarks for diﬀerential diagnosis.
Patients in VS/UWS show relative metabolic preservation of
the brainstem, probably relating to their preserved functions
of arousal and wakefulness [17]. Compared with VS/UWS,
patients in MCS show higher activity in the precuneus and
less widespread cortical hypometabolism [17]. Patients in
MCS and VS/UWS show relative decreases of metabolism
in the frontoparietal networks, comprising the medial pre-
frontal, precuneal, and lateral temporoparietal cortex, as well
as the thalamus, compared to healthy controls (Figure 2)
[17, 34]. These areas overlap with those of the so-called
default mode network, which is a pattern of brain regions
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Table 2: The Nociception Coma Scale revised.
Description
Motor response
(3) Localization to noxious
stimulation
The nonstimulated limb must locate
and make contact with the stimulated
body part at the point of stimulation.
(2) Flexion withdrawal
There is isolated flexion withdrawal
of at least one limb. The limb must
move away from the point of
stimulation.
(1) Abnormal posturing
Slow, stereotyped flexion, or
extension of the upper and/or lower
extremities occurs immediately after
the stimulus is applied.
(0) None/flaccid
There is no discernible movement
following application of noxious
stimulation, secondary to hypertonic




Production of words in response to
nociceptive stimulation. Each
verbalization must consist of at least
1 consonant-vowel-consonant
(C-V-C) triad. For example, “aie”
would not be acceptable, but “stop”
or “that hurts” would.
(2) Vocalization
At least one episode of nonreflexive
oral movement and/or vocalization
in response to stimulation (such as
“ah” or “aie”).
(1) Groaning
Groans are observed not
spontaneously but in response to
nociceptive stimulation.
(0) None No response to any of the above.
Facial expression
(3) Cry
Cries are observed not spontaneously
but in response to nociceptive
stimulation.
(2) Grimace
Grimaces are observed not




Clamping of jaws, tongue pumping,
yawning, chewing movement.
(0) None
There is no discernible facial
expression following application of
noxious stimulation.
that show similar dynamics of their spontaneous neuronal
activity and has been associated with internal awareness and
stimulus-independent thought [35]. In a study by Bruno et
al. [7], CRS-r total scores showed a linear correlation with
metabolism in default mode network regions. Furthermore,
regions of the external control network (a.k.a. extrinsic
control network), encompassing left and right lateral parietal
and lateral prefrontal cortices, have been found to be
more hypometabolic in VS/UWS than in MCS and normal
consciousness [36]. These areas are important for awareness
of the external world [18].
Phillips et al. [38] demonstrated the possibility of using
a computerized user-independent learning algorithm to
stratify patient groups by level of consciousness, thereby
calculating the probability that a DOC patient is “uncon-
scious” VS/UWS or “conscious” MCS or locked-in. Recently,
studies with FDG-PET have also found diﬀerences in brain
metabolism between MCS+ and MCS−, showing a relative
hypometabolism in left hemispheric language areas inMCS−
patients, indicating that this group could suﬀer from diﬀer-
ent degrees of aphasia [7].
Early DOC brain activation studies, measuring blood
flow using H2O-PET, showed that auditory stimulation leads
to activation in primary and associative auditory cortices
more in healthy controls and MCS patients than in VS/UWS
patients [39]. Interestingly, brain activation in MCS was
increased more as a response to emotionally meaningful
sounds (a baby crying, storytelling by a familiar voice) than
to meaningless sounds [39–41]. A main distinction between
MCS and VS/UWS, related to the level of consciousness,
is the potential for pain perception. A limited but growing
field of pain research showed that MCS patients do feel
pain [26]. Pain induction in healthy controls and MCS
patients is followed by activation in a widespread cortical
and subcortical pain matrix [12], while VS/UWS patients
only show activation restricted to lower-level subcortical and
primary cortical areas [42].
3.2. Magnetic Resonance Imaging. Magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI) is used to acquire detailed insight into the extent
of structural brain damage suﬀered by a DOC patient and is
now frequently replacing traditional computer tomography
techniques. MRI has higher spatial resolution, does not
expose the patient to radiation, and is becoming increasingly
available. However, an MRI scan is still not always easy to
obtain in noncollaborative patients with DOC. Although
there is yet no general understanding of how specific brain
damage correlates with the level of consciousness in a DOC
patient, certain types of structural brain damage can be
linked to prognosis. Pontine, basal gangliar and midbrain
damage have been associated with poor chances of recovery,
and can be detected using MRI techniques [43].
Functional MRI is a technique developed to visualize
brain activation patterns and has multiple applications, such
as “resting state” fMRI, which is a powerful addition to
the neuroimaging arsenal as a task-free imaging protocol.
This method looks at oscillating patterns of spontaneous
neuronal activity at the low-frequency range, visualizing
networks of brain areas that show similar spontaneous
activity (i.e., functional connectivity). Of particular interest
for the assessment of DOC patients is the default mode
network, the integrity of which has been shown to correlate
to the level of consciousness in a subject (for a review,
see [44]). Vanhaudenhuyse et al. [45] have shown that
at the group level, connectivity of the precuneus within
the default mode network disintegrates when proceeding
from normal consciousness to MCS, VS/UWS, and coma.









Figure 2: Spontaneous brain activity in VS/UWS, MCS, locked-in syndrome, and health, as seen with PET. A triangle is drawn around the












































Tennis imagery Spatial navigation
Control
Tennis imagery Spatial navigation
(b)
Figure 3: Active and passive paradigms. (a) Diﬀerences in event-related response between passive listening to an auditory train of names and
actively counting the occurrence of a specific name. Signals are strongest when the patient is counting (active paradigm) its own name. (b)
Answering “yes” or “no” by mental imagery using fMRI. Thinking of playing tennis (to answer “yes”) activated motor areas, while thinking
of walking through the house (to answer “no”) activated parahippocampal areas (adapted from [19, 37]).
However, its diagnostic power at the single subject level
remains to be shown. Moreover, Norton et al. [46] observed
an intact default mode network in two coma patients that
later recovered consciousness. This study shows that the
presence of a default mode network does not prove a patient
is conscious, although it may serve as a predictor of good
outcome.
fMRI activation studies have confirmed the previously
discussed PET activation studies, showing that auditory,
visual, and somatosensory activation is more restricted to
lower sensory regions in VS/UWS as compared to the more
widespread cortical activation seen in MCS [47–51]. For
example, Qin et al. [52] showed that the anterior cingulate
cortex (part of the limbic emotional network) shows activa-
tion during presentation of a patients’ own name, in a way
that correlates with patients’ level of consciousness.
fMRI can also be used to show voluntarily modulated,
motor-independent responses to simple commands [53].
Rodriguez Moreno et al. [54] asked patients diagnosed as
being in the MCS and VS/UWS to name pictures while lying
in an MRI scanner. All MCS patients, and two VS/UWS
patients, showed complete or partial activation of the object-
naming brain network. Bekinschtein et al. [55] have shown
that two patients previously diagnosed as being at the border
between VS/UWS and MCS responded to the task to move
their left or right hand by activating the dorsal premotor
cortex contralateral to the instructed hand. This indicates
that those patients were trying to move their hand, although
this was not translated into motor activity.
Owen et al. [56] pioneered an active fMRI paradigm
in which healthy control subjects and a DOC patient
were asked to perform two mental imagery tasks: “imagine
playing tennis” and “imagine walking through your own
house.” In healthy control subjects, performing the first
task activated motor areas, while the second task activated
parahippocampal areas (Figure 3). The patient previously
diagnosed as VS/UWS consistently showed brain activation
patterns similar to those seen in healthy control subjects,
implying that the diagnosis based on behavioral tests had
been false. Monti et al. [19] have used this mental imagery
technique to detect willful modulation of brain activity in
five DOC patients, of which only three showed signs of
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awareness in extensive behavioral tests after the fMRI scan.
Furthermore, the authors managed to establish a form of
communication with one patient that was initially diagnosed
as VS/UWS (but later shown to be behaviorally MCS).
This patient was able to answer five out of six questions
correctly using “yes” (play tennis) or “no” (walk through
your house) answers. However, in a similar mental imagery
experiment by Bardin et al. [57], twoMCS patients incapable
of communicating using the mental imagery paradigm, were
able to communicate outside the scanner (one subject via
head movements, the other verbally).
Diﬀusion tensor imaging is a relatively recent addition
to the analysis of structural data acquired with MRI and
is employed to measure axonal integrity. It analyses the
direction of water protons travelling along nerve fibers,
thereby visualizing white matter nerve tract structure
and orientation. In a diﬀusion tensor imaging study by
Ferna´ndez-Espejo et al. [58], VS/UWS and MCS patients
could be diﬀerentiated with 95% accuracy, based on struc-
tural brain damage in thalamus and subcortical white
matter. Finally, magnetic resonance spectroscopy may be
used for the detection of creatine, choline, N-acetylaspartate,
and lactate in predefined regions of interest. These sub-
stances are considered to be biomarkers of aerobic energy
metabolism, cell membrane synthesis/catabolism, cell viabil-
ity/density, and anaerobic glycolysis, respectively. The ratios
N-acetylaspartate/creatine and N-acetylaspartate/choline are
currently being validated as prognostic markers in DOC
patients [59, 60].
One of the main shortcomings of PET and fMRI is
the relatively bad temporal resolution, which is generally in
excess of 1.5 seconds. Cognitive processes usually take place
on a much shorter timescale, in the order of milliseconds. An
evaluation of remaining consciousness based only on PET or
fMRI therefore lacks vital information. Electroencephalog-
raphy is the method of choice to fill this niche in DOC
diagnosis.
3.3. Electroencephalography. Using “resting state” electroen-
cephalography (EEG) can improve diagnosis and prognosis
of DOC. Babiloni and colleagues [61] found that increased
alpha power correlated with recovery in a group of VS/UWS
patients. Similarly, occurrence of sleep spindles during peri-
ods of assumed sleep in DOC patients has been associated
with better outcome [62]. In a recent EEG sleep study, all
tested MCS patients showed characteristic sleep patterns
resembling those of healthy subjects [63]. These included
alternating periods of rapid eye movement and non-rapid
eye movement sleep, as well as the phenomenon of shorter
periods of slow-wave sleep at the end of the night than at the
beginning of the night (this is a normal sleep development
also occurring in healthy controls and thought to be related
to neural plasticity). Few of such sleep patterns could be
observed in VS/UWS patients. Instead, the VS/UWS patients
showed EEG patterns that did not change from night to day
or between eyes-open and eyes-closed recordings. However,
other studies did show significant diﬀerences in EEG patterns
during sleep as compared to wakefulness (for a review, see
[62]). Gosseries et al. [64] showed that analysis of the entropy
of resting state EEG data in patients in the (sub)acute phase
(less than onemonth post injury) of either coma, VS/UWS or
MCS also has possible diﬀerential diagnostic value. However,
patient entropy measurements at more than one month post
injury did not have this diagnostic potential.
By measuring “passive” event-related potentials using
EEG, insight can be gained on how the brain reacts to
salient external stimuli. In DOC patients, the occurrence of
event-related potentials that are thought to be a result of
cognitive functioning (e.g., P300 and mismatch negativity)
[59] has been linked to an increased chance of recovery [65].
However, similar event-related potentials have been shown
to occur in some chronic VS/UWS patients who failed to
recover [66].
Schnakers et al. [37] have shown the usefulness of
“active” event-related potential paradigms in DOC. Patients
were instructed to count the number of times a target name
was presented in an auditory stimulus train containing diﬀer-
ent names including the patient’s own name (Figure 3). Nine
MCS patients and none of the VS/UWS patients showed an
increase in command-related event-related potentials after
presentation of target names. This technique was also used
to detect consciousness in a case of total locked-in syndrome
[37], whereby a patient is fully conscious but completely
unable to communicate by bodily movements or even eye-
blinking. Cruse et al. [67] recently asked VS/UWS patients to
move their hand and used EEG to measure the event-related
potentials. These potentials were similar to normal in three
patients, indicating that they were misdiagnosed as a result
of their behavioral unresponsiveness.
Lastly, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), in
combination with EEG recording, can also be used for the
assessment of residual brain function of DOC patients [68].
TMS is a method used to stimulate a region of the cortex,
while EEG recordings make it possible to visualize changes
in eﬀective connectivity in response to this stimulation.
Therefore, TMS-EEG can be used to analyze the intactness
of neural circuits and can oﬀer important clues about
the state of consciousness a patient is in. TMS-EEG has
been tested in healthy controls during midazolam-induced
unconsciousness [69] and non-rapid eye movement sleep
[70]. In these conditions, the cortical response following
TMS remained more local and lasted for a shorter period of
time than during wakefulness. Rosanova et al. [68] examined
EEG responses to TMS stimulation in VS/UWS patients and
detected short, localized responses similar to those seen in
healthy controls during sleep and anesthesia. In contrast, the
EEG response in MCS patients was more complex, travelled
farther through the brain and lasted longer than in VS/UWS
patients, more similar to the healthy awake state.
3.4. Other Assessments. A variety of other diagnostic tools
is currently in development and is being tested on DOC
patients. Amongst themost promising are electromyography,
“sniﬃng”-tests, and functional near-infrared spectroscopy
(fNIRS). Electromyography has been used to study the
occurrence of subthreshold muscle activity in response to
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verbal command. In a study by Bekinschtein and colleagues
[71], one VS/UWS and two MCS patients showed increases
in the electromyography signal related to the command
“move your hand.” Willful modulation of nasal pressure
(“sniﬃng”) can also be used for communication, writing
texts and driving a wheelchair [72]. Sniﬃng can provide
a control interface that is fast, accurate, robust and highly
conserved following severe injury. It is therefore possible
that this can be used as a diagnostic tool in DOC, although
more research is needed. When studying the brain, fMRI
has the advantage of showing with high precision the brain
areas that are involved in cognition and consciousness.
As mentioned before, this information can be used to
communicate via brain modulation by the patient. However,
although attempts for such fMRI-based communication
have been successful in a number of cases [19], it has the
disadvantage of being dependent on expensive and immobile
fMRI scanning equipment. fNIRS might oﬀer a solution to
this problem in the near future [73], as it is a portable, silent,
low-cost alternative to fMRI. The technique capitalizes on the
changing optical characteristics of blood in the visible and
near-infrared light range, when oxygenated hemoglobin in
the blood becomes deoxygenated due to oxygen extraction
by brain tissues. Although initial fNIRS studies have been
performed in several neurological and psychiatric disorders
[74], validation of the technique in DOC is still awaited. A
limitation of fNIRS is the fact that it cannot measure activity
in deep brain structures. However, the technique oﬀers the
possibility of continuous scanning for longer periods of time
than would be possible with fMRI and can include patients
that have physiological limitations that make fMRI scanning
impossible.
4. Conclusion
After years of study, precise characterization of DOC remains
elusive. In recent years, it has become ever clearer that the
separate subconditions (coma, VS/UWS, MCS) fit into the
percept of a gradually recuperating consciousness. With the
help of standardized behavioral tests and PET scanning,
it has become possible to subdivide the MCS into MCS−
(i.e., nonreflex movements) and MCS+ (i.e., response to
command). This raises questions regarding the phenomenon
of “minimal” consciousness. When is minimal consciousness
enough to call a patient conscious? What is the moment
of “no consciousness” and how can we objectively measure
this in another being? This problem is emphasized in the
renaming of the vegetative state into unresponsive wakeful-
ness syndrome, reminding physicians to remain careful when
making inferences regarding conscious awareness based on
behavioral assessment of motor responsiveness.
Correct diagnosis of the level of remaining conscious-
ness in a DOC patient is important for multiple reasons.
First, it helps to ensure that appropriate caretaking can
take place, tailored to the specific needs of each patient.
These needs may include treatment for pain, and access to
rehabilitation support and methods for motor-independent
or motor signal-enhancing communication as mentioned
in this review. Second, knowing the actual state of the
patient can aid in prognosis. The experiments and their
accompanying behavioral assessment, which was usually the
CRS-r, mentioned in this review were performed from five
days after brain injury to 23.7 years (Table 3). This shows that
no general consensus exists on the time since injury at which
to conduct diﬀerential diagnosis. However, the implications
for palliative care and prognosis mean that behavioral assess-
ment and neuroimaging should be administered as soon as
the patient is stabilized and shows signs of brain arousal
(i.e., recovery from the comatose state). As the condition
of DOC patients is more prone to being transitional during
the acute phase, caretakers should retest during the subacute
phase. Third, the ongoing subcategorisation of DOC might
have societal, ethical and legal consequences. Care of DOC
patients is costly, and insurance companies might base
payment of insurance money for this care on the presence
of consciousness in the patient.
As for now, the CRS-r is still considered to be the best
behavioral scale that exists for diﬀerential diagnosis of DOC.
Its use in hospitals and nursing homes should be encouraged,
as it has been shown to detect misdiagnosis at a rate of 30–
40% [21], while at the same time being relatively easy to learn
and apply by amember of the caretaking staﬀ. A robust train-
ing in applying the scale and experience in conducting the
scale is definitely recommended. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the trust in the CRS-r to deliver good diﬀerential
diagnosis is not based on validation with a gold standard, as
no such standard exists. Rather, credibility for the diﬀerential
capabilities of the scale comes from proven good interrater
reliability, test-retest reliability, internal consistency, the fact
that it includes all of the Aspen Workgroup criteria for
good standardized administration and scoring, as well as its
consistency with neuroimaging results.
Brain imaging techniques based on passive paradigms,
as well as other ancillary methods, are being validated
for accuracy. The increasing number of reported success
stories in recent literature illustrates the importance and
improvements of these techniques. PET scanning is one of
the most valuable additional tests at the moment, having
shown to be able to make a probabilistic distinction between
unconscious (VS/UWS) and conscious (locked-in syndrome
and controls). Active paradigms, however, can have increased
diagnostic power augmenting that of behavioral tests and
passive paradigms. Mental imagery fMRI or EEG paradigms,
such as those where a patient is asked to think of playing
tennis or walking through the house to answer “yes” or “no,”
can be validated by asking questions to which the answer is
known. This technique, and variants of it, have already been
successfully used in clinical practice. Only limited inferences
can be made on the quality of the conscious experience in a
patient in which consciousness has been detected according
to neuroimaging-based examinations, but not according
to behavioral tests. An intact DMN increases the chance
of the patient having spontaneous, self-reflective thoughts
(considered to be a key ingredient of human consciousness);
brain responses to stimuli as seen by PET, fMRI or EEG that
seem near-to-normal suggest that the patient can “feel” the
stimulus. Our closest approximation to proof of cognitive
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Table 3: Overview of ancillary assessments.
Study Type Behavioral scale
Time between brain injury and
assessment
Thibaut et al. [36] PET CRS-r 17 days–270 months
Phillips et al. [38] PET CRS-r 1–285 months
Bruno et al. [7] PET CRS-r 1.2–82 months
Boly et al. [39] PET GCS 20–124 days
Boly et al. [12] PET GCS 37–116 days
Laureys et al. [42] PET GCS 36 ± 9 days
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. [45] fMRI CRS-r 5 days–5 years
Qin et al. [52] fMRI CRS-r 2–18 months
Rodriguez Moreno et al. [54] fMRI CRS-r 2 months–2 years
Bekinschtein et al. [55] fMRI CRS-r 5 and 16 months
Monti et al. [19] fMRI CRS-r 1.3–60.8 months
Bardin et al. [57] fMRI CRS-r —
Ferna´ndez-Espejo et al. [58] fMRI CRS-r 1–19 months
Babiloni et al. [61] EEG —
32–98 days. Follow-up was done
after 3 months
Landsness et al. [63] EEG CRS-r 25 days–25 years
Gosseries et al. [64] EEG CRS-r <1 month
Cavinato et al. [65] EEG — 2-3 months
Fischer et al. [75] EEG —
4–261 months. Follow-up was
done for up to 1 year
Perrin et al. [66] EEG CRS-r 13 days–10 months
Schnakers et al. [37] EEG CRS-r 12 days–23.7 years
Rosanova et al. [68] TMS-EEG CRS-r 12–1399 days
Bekinschtein et al. [71] EMG CRS 3 or more months
PET: positron emission tomography; fMRI: functional magnetic resonance imaging; CRS-r: Coma Recovery Scale revised; GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale [76];
CRS: Coma Recovery Scale.
functioning similar to conscious control subjects comes
from those patients that manage to willfully modulate brain
activity or even answer to “yes”/“no”-questions. However, it
is questionable to what extend MCS patients can answer dif-
ficult questions regarding self-reflection correctly. Learning
more about the subjective experience of minimal, fluctuating
consciousness in MCS patients might therefore be extremely
diﬃcult using question-answer paradigms. Extrapolating
insight into the self-reflection capability of MCS+ patients
or those patients that have exited the MCS might be one
strategy.
Contrary to standardized behavioral examinations, the
high acquisition and maintenance costs of PET and fMRI
machines, as well as the necessary availability of experienced
staﬀ to scan the patient and analyze and interpret the scan-
ning data, place them out of reach for many centers. These
costs will eventually go down, while up-to-date methods of
analysis of brain scanning data, obtained in a nonspecialized
medical center with enough expertise to conduct a specific
ancillary test, might be performed by specialized coma
centers. Furthermore, the development of cheaper, portable
and easier to apply techniques, like those based on EEG
and fNIRS, seems to oﬀer promising alternatives to fMRI.
With appropriate though relatively limited training, these
techniques could even be used in nursing homes or at the
patient’s home (although application and data analysis of
the method might still be done by specialized researchers),
thereby reaching a bigger group of patients. Even though the
use of ancillary diagnostic techniques in the acute phase is
usually limited to acquisition of structural (MRI/computer
tomography) brain images, stabilized subacute and chronic
patients can benefit from the increasing scale of ancillary
diagnostic methods described in this paper.
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